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Abstract: An empirical study was carried out in Mkata plains, eastern Tanzania in 
order to establish factors determining resource-use conflicts between smallholder 
farmers and pastoralists. PRA approaches and questionnaire survey were employed 
to collected data from two pastoral and two agro – pastoral villages. The main 
conflict types and their intensities include inter-ethnic conflicts> village vs 
village,> village vs state agencies> intra-ethnic group conflicts. The perceived 
causes of conflicts were crop damages by livestock, pastoralists disregarding 
village boundaries, overcharging compensation for crop damage by farmers, 
confiscating of livestock by farmers, ineptness of government officials to intervene 
to prevent conflicts. Key factors significantly enhancing resource-use conflicts were 
increasing herd size, market integration, and increase in household wealthy 
differentiation. A key factor likely to significantly minimize the conflicts was strong 
local leadership. The mechanism employed to resolving resource use-conflicts was 
formation of “conflict resolution committee” at village level. But, only agro-
pastoral villages have formed full functional committees. It is recommended to build 
capacity of government officials to analyze and resolve resource-use conflicts; and 
to enhance capacity of local structures for conflict resolution. 
 




Conceptualising Resource-Use Conflicts  
There are many perspectives and definitions of the term conflict. Robbins (1994) 
defines conflict as a process that begins when one party perceives that another party 
has negatively affected something that the first party cares about. Wallensteen 
(1988), Mason and Mullaer (2007) define conflict as a social interaction in which a 
minimum of two parties strive at the same moment to acquire the same resources. In 
case of natural resource relations and because resources are limited and scarce, and 
peoples’ needs often exceed availability, this leads to blocking behaviour, with both 
parties trying to get more of the resources than the others (Idrissou et al., 2013). 
When one party is perceived to block the access to the resources of another, a 
conflict will probably ensue. For this reason resources-use conflicts over land, 
water, wildlife and forestry are ubiquitous (Ortiz, 1999; Hares, 2009; Idrissou et al., 
2011; Rurai, 2012). Frequently replayed resource-use conflicts in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, involves farmers and pastoralists competing for patchy multiple-use 
resources especially in arid and semi-arid areas.
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Kumar (1998); Rurai (2012); Idrissou et al. (2013) argue that resource-use conflicts 
occur when different categories of resource users have competing demands for 
shrinking resources, and may attach different values to the resource base. Thus, 
resource-use conflicts occur in settings that involve an array of culture, economic, 
and political arrangements that may influence outcomes of the conflict process. 
Therefore, resource-use conflicts tend to vary in dimension, level and intensity, and 
may take place at different levels, from within the household to local, regional and 
societal scale (Anyling and Kelly, 1997; Oviedo, 1999).  
 
Background to Mkata Plains 
Mkata plains in Kilosa district, eastern Tanzania, were at one time a centre of 
colonial plantation economy. This historical legacy continues to influence land-use 
patterns and resource relationship in the area. The area is characterised by multi-
ethnic population, whereby the majority are descendants of immigrant plantation 
workers or pastoral tribes from northern Tanzania (Koponen, 1994; Beidelman, 
1960). Main land-use practices in the area include: subsistence farming, 
transhumant pastoralism, commercial farms, commercial ranching and wildlife 
conservation. Thus extensive forms of land-use are the dominant production 
systems. However, the overlap of different land-use systems, resource-regimes and 
competitions; compounded by rapid population increase have increased pressure on 
land resources and strained relationship between different user groups (Kisoza et 





Figure 1 (a): Irrigated dry season crops 
along Msowero river bank  
(b): A pastoral herd at Msowero village  
 
 
Thus Mkata plains were known as foci of resource-use conflicts since early 1930s 
(Koponen, 1994, Liliffe, 1969). This is particularly prevalent between pastoralists 
and farmers (Beidelman,1960). The mounting conflicts during late 1960s prompted 
the Kilosa District Local Government to set aside 8 villages for pastoralists in 
Mkata plains (KDC, 2000). However, this initiative had never resolved farmer-
pastoralist conflicts in the area. This paper quantitatively analyses the determinants 
of resource-use conflicts in Mkata plains. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
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Description of the Study Area 
Mkata plains occupy part of Kilosa and Mvomero districts in Morogoro region, 
Eastern Tanzania. The plains are bounded between 50 4’ to 70 15’S and 370 00 and 
370 55’E, covering approximately 7,000 km2 (Figure 2). The area experiences arid 
and semi-arid climatic regimes with annual rainfall ranging from 600 to 730 mm. 
 
 
Figure 2: Remote sensing imagery map of Mkata plains  
 (Adopted from Nduwamungu, 2001) 
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Two agro-pastoral villages (Mbwade, Msowero) and two pastoral villages 
(Twatwatwa and Mabwegere) were purposively selected for this study. The 
justification for selecting these villages was high prevalence of resource-use 
conflicts in the agro-pastoral villages that are shared by both farmers and 
pastoralists whereby, the pastoral villages were involved in resource–use conflicts 
with neighbouring farmers villages. 
 
Data Collection 
Data collection methods used included rapid rural appraisal (PRA) approaches, 
focus group discussion (FGD) and questionnaire survey. Tools used in PRA include 
problem ranking, wealth ranking, transect walks, and village resource mapping.  A 
pre-tested structured questionnaire was used for household interviews. Informal 
interviews with key informants were carried out to clarify issues arising from other 
data collection methods. 
 
Sampling Procedure 
The target population was all residents in the four study villages. The unit of 
analysis was a household. A simple random sampling was employed in selecting 
units of enquiry. The sampling intensity ranged between 5 to 10 % and aimed at 
sampling a minimum of 30 households from each study village.  
 
Data Analysis 
A logistic model was developed in order to predict the likelihood of resource-use 
conflicts. The model specifications are as follows: 
 
The dependent variable – occurrence of resource-use conflicts – was conceived as a 
dichotonomous dummy variable with the responses: “yes” for high conflict 
magnitude with value 1, or “no” for none to low conflict magnitudes with value 
“0”.  The conflict magnitude in each study village was rated on - conflict scale - 
with scores: violent clashes (6), animosity (5), disagreements (4), arguments (3), 
tensions (2) no conflict (1). Score 4 was used as a cut-off point for high magnitude 
of resource-use conflicts. 
 
The logistic model predicts the likelihood of occurrence of the event (Menard, 
1995),  which is predicted by odds (Y = 1). That is the ratio of the probability that Y 
= 1 to the probability that Y ≠ 1. 
This was given by equation:  
 
Odd Y = P(Y = 1)/(1 - P(Y = 1 )…………………………………..……(1) 
 
The logit (Y)  is given by the natural log of Odds ;    that is 
ln p(Yi = 1)  =  log Odds = logit (Y)………….......…………..……..….(2) 
                      1 – p (Yi = 1) 
Where:  
            Yi = i
th observed value of resource-use conflict 
 
The logistic regression modelspecification was of the form: 
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Ln p(Yi = 1)  =  βo + β1 X1 +……  + βkXk     ……………......…(3) 
                      1 – p (Yi = 1)     
 
Where; 
Yi   = Dependent variable, (resource-use conflict) 
Xi  = Explanatory variables (X1 =  Perceived  environmental degradation); X2  = 
Crop- livestock integration); X3 =  State policies, X4 = socio-economic 
factors; X5 = market integration (proxied as distance to market  in km); 
The statistic significance of relationship between independent variable and the 
predictors was tested by the Model – Chi square at a significance level of p (< 0.05).  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 presents occurrence of resource-use conflicts in the study villages. 
Resource-use conflicts were prevalent in all the study villages, which were 
acknowledged by 72.3% of respondents. However, only 56.5% of respondents at 
Msowero village acknowledged presence of resource-use conflicts. This could be 
attributable to the fact that the village government had recently formed a conflict 
resolution committee to mediate farmers and pastoralists resource-use conflicts. 
Furthermore, in agro-pastoral villages the pastoralists are integrated in the village’s 
government administration, and they become more accountable to formal structures 
of governance, which are dominated by farmers.  
 
Table 1: Responses distribution on occurrence of resource-use conflicts by 
study villages in Mkata plains 















(n = 30) 
Total 
 
(N = 267) 
Yes 37 (100.0)* 30 (100.0) 96(56.5) 30 (100.0) 193 (72.3) 
No 0.0 0.0 74(43.5) 0.0 74(27.7) 
 
*Numbers in brackets are percentages 
 
All respondents in pastoral villages - Twatwatwa and Mabwegere - reported 
existence of resource-use conflicts with farmers. This is mostly probably due to 
boundary disputes that arose following titling of pastoralists’ villages, which was 
challenged by farmers.  
 
Table 2 show focused groups’ discussion results on types and magnitude of 
resource-use conflicts existing in the study villages.  
 
The results indicate four main types of resource-use conflicts occurring in the study 
area which include: inter-ethnic conflicts, village versus village conflicts, village 
versus state agency conflicts and intra-ethnic conflicts. The inter-ethnic resource-
use conflicts were ranked highest, followed by village to village conflicts, then 
village versus state agency and lastly the intra-ethnic conflicts. 
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Table 2: Types and magnitudes of resource-use conflicts by study villages in 
Mkata plains 
Score and ranking of conflict intensity  
Conflict types 
Twatwatwa Mabwegere Msowero 
 

































































Key:     - Scores, √√√√ - very high, √√√- high, √√- moderate, √- low  
                 -NA = Not applicable 
 
High inter-ethnic conflicts were reported from the pastoral villages. This is because 
residents in pastoral villages are mainly Maasai pastoralists who were collectively 
blamed for incidences of crop damage by cattle in neighbouring farmers’ villages, 
leading to conflicts between farmers and herders. Mbwiro (2002) and Brehony et al. 
(2001) reported similar farmer-pastoralists conflicts in other areas in the country. 
 
Intra-ethnic group resource-use conflict was reported at Twatwatwa village, where 
the local elites, who are also large herd owners, were proposing to partition the 
village communal grazing land. This was being challenged by the young generation 
who were worried to lose if village grazing land was to be partitioned. The main 
motive behind a proposal to partition  the village common grazing land was to 
enable some of the wealthier households to attain land as an immovable asset that 
could be used as collateral for bank loans. Kajembe and Mwinihoke (2001), Ostrom 
et al., (2002) and Galaty, (1994) reported similar inter-generational resource-use 
conflicts.  
 
Perceived Causes of Resource-Use Conflicts in the Study Area 
The respondents perceived causes of resource-use conflicts involving Maasai 
pastoralists and farmers are presented in Table 3. The majority of respondents 
(70.4%) identified crop damage by livestock as main cause of resource-use 
conflicts. Crop damage occurs when livestock trespass into crop fields in villages 
occupied by farmers. Another important cause of conflicts mentioned by 67.0% 
respondents was reluctance of government officials to timely intervene to diffuse 
tensions between farmers and herders. Ineptness of government officials could be 
attributed to lack of conflict resolution skills among government officials, but could 
also be associated with corrupt practices. Allegations of pastoralists corrupting 
government officials were mentioned by 44.9% of respondents. The study revealed 
that both farmers and herders hold different views on causes of conflicts and their 
escalations. 
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Table 3: Perceived causes of resource-use conflicts in study villages  
Number of respondents 
(n= 267) 
 
Cause for resource-use conflict 
Number % Rank 
Crop damage by livestock 18 70.4 1 
Government officials reluctance to take action on 







Excessively large herds of cattle 160 59.9 3 
Pastoralist corrupting government officials 120 44.9 4 
Farmers forcibly confiscating cattle 108 40.4 5 
Warring behaviour of herding warriors 92 34.5 6 
Herders violating boundaries 90 33.7 7 
Farmers disregarding village boundaries 49 24.7 9 
Hatred between pastoralists and farmers 64 23.9 10 
Heavy penalties demanded by farmers for crop 
damage 
51 19.1 11 
Government officials favouring farmers 70 26.2 8 
• The percentage total up to more than 100 because of multiple responses 
 
The pastoralists claimed that a tendency of farmers to confiscate cattle suspected to 
cause crop damage flare up resource-use conflicts. A fairly high number (40.4%) of 
respondents reported confiscation of cattle by farmers as the main source of 
conflict. Confiscation of cattle was reported to trigger off violent clashes between 
farmers and herders in December, 2000 (Figure 3). 
 
Furthermore, pastoralists claim that farmers tend to over charge compensation in 
event of crop damage inflicted by livestock. While 26.2% respondents mentioned 
that government officials tend to favour farmers in delivering adjudication on 
farmer-herder conflicts.  
 
Determinants of Resource-Use Conflicts in Mkata Plains 
Table 4 shows key factors contributing to resource-use conflict in the study area in 
Mkata plains. Contribution of different variables to likelihood of resource-use 
conflict was analysed using a logistic model. The model parameters predicted 
correctly at 92 2% and significantly at p < 0.05. The -2 Log Likelihood = 26.405 
indicating a high fit between the model and data. Whereas the Nagelkerke R square 
= 0.846 suggesting that the variables in the model accounts to about 84.6 % of the 
observed variation in the variables under study.  
 
The results show that the increasing herd size of individual pastoralists contributed 
significantly (P<0.05) on the likelihood of conflicts with farmers by a factor of 
7.197. A plausible explanation for this is that when a household increases the 
number of livestock, demand for grazing land also increases. In turn, this 
necessitates high herd mobility which increases the likelihood to trespass into 
farmers villages and causing crop damage which leads to conflict with farmers. On 
the other hand, the increase in the herd size is associated with a decrease in herding 
efficiency, where herders fail to control the animals sufficiently.  
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Figure  3: Part of farmers’ village burnt down during farmers-herders’ clashes 
at Rudewa- Mbuyuni village in Mkata plains 
 
Increase in market integration significantly (P<0.05) increased the likelihood of 
resource–use conflicts by a factor of 2.607. This can be explained by the 
observation that in responding to settled life and increasing land value, the 
pastoralists in Mkata plains had mobilised to obtain formal lease holds to their 
village land as a measure of attaining tenure security. However, this measure has led 
into protracted boundary disputes with neighbouring farmers villages, who have 
customary claims to disputed areas. Furthermore, recent economic liberalisation 
policies implemented in the area have made possible for rich local Maasai to buy 
previously state owned sisal estates and ranches. 
 
Table 4: Determinant factors of resources-use conflicts in Mkata plains 
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 Variables in equation β S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(β) 
 Herd size 4.276 1.201 12.673 1 .000* 7.197 
 Market integration .958 .541 3.133 1 .017* 2.607 
 State intervention 1.465 1.187 1.522 1 .217 4.326 
 Wealth differentiation .812 .532 2.330 1 .127    2.253 
Local leadership strength -1.401 .762 3.379 1 .046* .246 
Education level -1.215 .619 3.852 1 .050 .297 
Migration -1.734 1.261 1.891 1  .169   .176 
 
Constant 14.469 4.153 12.140 1 .000 .000 
Model summary 
- Overall percentage                   = 92.20% 
      - Model Chi – Square                  = 61.098 
      - 2 log likelihood                         = 26.405 
      -  Nagelkerke R squared              =   0.846 
     * = Significant at p < 0.05 level 
 
This has triggered resentments from farmers who were previous workers of these 
farms currently squatting there, and facing increasing land shortage and threat of 
ultimate eviction from those premises. Furthermore, covert resentments were 
expressed by fellow pastoralists who used to graze on the recently privatized farms.  
 
Again an increasing market for horticultural crops has led to a closure of wetland 
areas located in farmers’ villages, which were previously utilized as open access dry 
season grazing areas by the pastoralists. This has in turn led to increased 
competition for shrinking wetland areas and escalation in resource-use conflicts. 
Furthermore, pastoralists in Mkata plains previously had free access to crop 
residues in farms after harvest. However, increasing commoditization in the area 
has led to commercialization of crop residues. Pastoralists are required to pay for 
grazing rights in order to graze on crop residues. However, there is no elaborated 
institutional mechanism to control pastoralists’ access to crop residues in farms.  A 
number of cheating cases in accessing crop residuals were reported by both farmers 
and pastoralist 
 
Intervention by state government is positively related to resource-use conflicts, with 
a positive regression coefficient (β = 1.465) and a Wald ratio of 1.522. A plausible 
explanation for this is that government policies aimed at solving certain problems 
may generate other unintended negative externalities. A case in point in Mkata 
plains is that formal titling of pastoral villages, which was intended to providing 
security of tenure to pastoral villages, had engendered protracted boundary disputes 
with neighbouring farmers’ villages and Mkata state ranch. Bush and Opp (2000) 
argue that most interventions by state governments which lead to change in access 
to resources may lead to escalations in resource-use conflicts because in most cases 
the interventions are not community focused.  
 
Increase in household wealth differentiation although is not significant (at p < 0.05) 
has a strong relationship to resource-use conflicts with a positive regression 
coefficient (β = 0.8129) and a Wald ratio of 2.33. This implies that increasing 
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household wealth differentiation was likely to increase resource-use conflicts in 
Mkata plains. Wealthier pastoralists at Twatwatwa village are also attempting to 
partition the village communal grazing, in an anticipation of obtaining a large share 
of land if this proposal gets community blessing. This measure has led to intra-
ethnic discontents and was opposed by younger generation who fear to lose out to 
large herd owners if partitioning was carried out.  
 
Results show that strong local leadership could significantly (P<0.05) minimise 
resource-use conflicts by a factor of 0.246. Attributes of strong local leadership 
include making binding decisions at a local level and minimum recourse to higher 
authorities. It has long been realized that local resource users have the ability to 
make decisions on how to govern local resources and mitigate resource-use 
conflicts (McKean and Ostrom, 1995). In this study it was observed that effective 
conflict resolution committees were formed in agro-pastoral villages - Msowero and 
Mbwade – this was partly attributed to strong leadership.  
 
Increase in education level was strongly related to reduction in resource-use 
conflicts with a regression coefficient of β = - 1.215, and a Wald ratio of 3.852. This 
could be attributable to a fact that by attending school, pastoral children get an 
opportunity to share culture with children from farmers’ ethnic groups and change 
the value systems. Thus minimising chances of developing identity conflicts (Aarts,  
2011). Maiese (2003) and Idrissou et al. (2011) observe that conflicts over identity 
arises wherever group members feel that their sense of self esteem have been denied 
legitimacy and respect. The authors further assert that identity conflicts tend to be 
aggressive and tend to persist. This observation is particularly pertinent to East 
African pastoral groups including Maasai who have institutionalized violence 
behaviour and armed warrior age-grades.  
 
Migration had a negative relationship to resource-use conflicts in Mkata plains, with 
a regression coefficient of β = - 1.734 and a Wald ration of 1.891. This suggests that 
increasing migration is likely to reduce resource -use conflicts locally. This is based 
on the observation than large herd owners engage in long range out migration from 
the area. This practise tends to ease pressure on shrinking resources, as such 
minimising intra ethnic conflicts within pastoral communities. According to 
Herlocker (1999) the pastoralists have for generations practised herd mobility and 
herd splitting as a measure against environmental risks as well as resource-use 
conflicts. The regression model results of the study area show high significance 
level of some factors and high correlation coefficient levels for all factors; this 
suggests that the empirical data supports hypothesized variables in the model. 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusion 
Resource-use conflicts in Mkata plains involve farmers and immigrant pastoralists 
who compete over shrinking land resources. The conflict tends to be polarized to 
ethnic divide pitting Maasai pastoralist against farmers’ ethnic groups. Both farmers 
and pastoralist hold different views on causes of conflicts including crop damage by 
livestock, pastoralists disregarding village boundaries, farmers overcharging 
compensation for crop damage, confiscating of livestock by farmers. Both farmers 
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and pastoralists expressed the failures of government agencies to timely intervene to 
prevent escalation of conflicts. The ineptness of government agencies implied 
corruption and or ignorance of governmental officials in resolving conflicts. The 
factors that significantly lead to escalation of resource-use conflicts were increase in 
household herd size and increased market integration. While a strong local 
leadership could significantly minimize resource-use conflicts.  
 
The causes of resource-use conflicts identified by respondents in this study have 
differential impacts on outcomes of conflict process. As such any measures taken to 
resolve these conflicts must also address the underlying causes to these conflicts. 
Whereby some causes have a causal effect relationship with conflict outcomes, 
these are referred to as proximate causes or determinant factors, while other factors 
have indirect effects. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to resolve and transform resource-use conflicts in the study area it is 
recommended to:  
• build the capacity of government officials to analyse resource-use conflicts 
and train on alternative conflict resolution skills 
• enhance the capacity of local level structures to resolving resource use 
conflicts 
• institutionalise conflict resolution processes in the District Council and 
village levels; andpromote good governance principles in the study area 
that emphasizes on transparency, accountability and fairness amongst the 
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